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Canadian Civil Justice: Relief in Small and
Simple Matters in an Age of Efficiency
Jonathan Silver & Trevor C.W. Farrow*
Abstract
Canada is in the midst of an access to justice crisis. The ris-
ing costs and complexity of legal services in Canada have
surpassed the need for these services. This article briefly
explores some obstacles to civil justice as well as some of
the court-based programmes and initiatives in place across
Canada to address this growing access to justice gap. In par-
ticular, this article explains the Canadian civil justice system
and canvasses the procedures and programmes in place to
make the justice system more efficient and improve access
to justice in small and simple matters. Although this article
does look briefly at the impact of the global financial crisis
on access to justice efforts in Canada, we do not provide
empirical data of our own on this point. Further, we con-
clude that there is not enough existing data to draw correla-
tions between austerity measures in response to the global
crisis and the challenges facing Canadian civil justice. More
evidence-based research would be helpful to understand
current access to justice challenges and to make decisions
on how best to move forward with meaningful innovation
and policy reform. However, there is reason for optimism in
Canada: innovative ideas and a national action plan provide
reason to believe that the country can simplify, expedite,
and increase access to civil justice in meaningful ways over
the coming years.
Keywords: Canada, small and simple matters, austerity, civil
justice, access to justice
Canada is simultaneously trending negatively and posi-
tively in its delivery of civil justice. A growing gap
between legal needs and the affordability and availability
of legal services threatens access to justice for many
Canadians. At the same time, however, provinces and
territories are implementing a number of programmes
aimed at expediting and streamlining dispute resolution
in small and simple civil matters. In this article, we
address both of these trends. Our research question is
simple: what reforms and initiatives are available in
Canada to close the gap between legal needs and the
costs and complexity of legal services? While it is
beyond the scope of our research to evaluate the relative
merits of all of these Canadian initiatives, we provide
some information on the efficacy and popularity of these
* Jonathan Silver, B.A. Honors, J.D. 2015, Osgoode Hall Law School. Tre-
vor C.W. Farrow is Professor and Associate Dean, Osgoode Hall Law
School. He is very grateful to Jonathan Silver, who took the lead in
researching and writing this article.
programmes where data are available. We also briefly
highlight the current push for greater efficiency in civil
justice, along with some implications of global austerity
on these initiatives, but we do not focus extensively on
efficiency or austerity measures. As will be explained,
without the benefit of strong empirical data, which is
required, it is difficult to draw correlations between
global austerity and changes in Canadian civil justice in
an efficiency-based access to justice landscape.
This article started as a summary report on the status of
Canadian simplified civil procedures for the 2015 XV
World Congress of Procedural Law and grew into a
more fulsome research project on Canadian civil justice.
Our goal in this article is to provide an overview of Can-
ada’s approach to relief in small and simple civil mat-
ters, to draw connections between programmes in place
across Canada primarily aimed at creating a more effi-
cient legal system, and – by doing so – to assist current
efforts designed to address the very challenging but
important project of improving the accessibility of civil
justice. This article proceeds as follows. In Part 1, we
provide a background of the Canadian civil justice sys-
tem and outline some of the challenges it faces. In Part
2, we detail specific mechanisms and programmes for
relief in small and simple matters, including: (i) simpli-
fied procedures and fast track litigation; (ii) summary
judgement and special cases; (iii) summary trials; (iv)
small claims courts; and (v) court-based alternative dis-
pute resolution. In Part 3, we conclude with observa-
tions about the delivery of civil justice in small and sim-
ple matters in the future.
1 The Canadian Context
In order to contextualise our discussion of simplified
procedures in Canada, we explain three inter-related
aspects of the Canadian civil justice system. First, we
explain the constitutional and legal framework of civil
justice, with particular emphasis on the division of juris-
diction over civil matters. Second, we outline the state
of access to justice in Canada and some of the impacts of
the global financial crisis on Canada. Finally, we explain
overarching principles of civil justice in Canada that aim
to achieve fair and expedient dispute resolution.
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1.1 The Legal Framework of Civil Justice in
Canada
Canada is a federal state with constitutionally empow-
ered provincial and federal governments. All of the
Canadian provinces follow the common law tradition,
except for Québec, which derives its origins from Civil
Law.
As we have explained elsewhere,1 responsibility for the
administration of civil justice and civil courts in Canada
is split between the provincial and federal governments.
The Constitution Act, 1867 grants provincial govern-
ments legislative authority over ‘the administration of
justice in the province’ and ‘Procedure in Civil Matters’
in provincial courts.2 Therefore, procedural law and
simplified procedures vary from province to province.
Civil matters are typically heard in provincial Superior
Courts, which are also known as section 96 courts based
on their enumeration in the Constitution Act, 1867.3
These provincial courts are courts of ‘inherent jurisdic-
tion’ and have broad jurisdiction to hear most matters.4
Responsibility for Superior Courts is split between the
federal and provincial governments. The Supreme
Court of Canada (‘Supreme Court’) recently explained
this split jurisdiction: ‘While the federal government is
responsible for the appointment of s. 96 judges … the
provincial legislatures enact laws and adopt regulations
pertaining to courts, rules of court and civil procedure,
or delegate this function to another body.’5
Although procedural law may diverge across provinces,
Canada’s uniform court system ensures a certain level of
consistency. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to
hear appeals on all matters from the appellate courts
across the country, and its decisions are binding nation-
wide.6 Even if an appeal is decided in the context of a
legislative regime found in only one province, the prin-
ciples underlying the Supreme Court’s judgements
influence the interpretation of all procedural codes and
laws. Nevertheless, there is no right of appeal to the
1. J. Silver and T.C.W. Farrow, Interim Relief in Canadian Courts (2015),
at 1-2 [unpublished].
2. Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict., c 3, s. 92(14), reprinted in
RSC 1985, App II, No. 5 [Constitution Act, 1867]. See also Ontario v.
Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario, 2013 SCC 43, paras. 32-33,
[2013] 3 SCR 3 [Criminal Lawyers’ Association].
3. Constitution Act, 1867, above n. 2, s 96. This constitutional provision
gives authority to the Governor General (on the advice of the Cabinet
of the federal government) to select judges to sit in provincial Superior
Courts. Canada also has Federal Courts, but these are statutory courts
with specific jurisdiction over matters delegated to them, such as Intel-
lectual Property and Maritime law. The majority of civil proceedings
occur in the Superior Courts, but for more information of Federal Courts
in Canada, see Federal Court of Canada, ‘About the Court’ (2012),
available at: <http:// cas -ncr -nter03. cas -satj. gc. ca/ portal/ page/ portal/
fc_ cf_ en/ About>.
4. MacMillan Bloedel Ltd v. Simpson, [1995] 4 SCR 725, para. 38, 130
DLR (4th) 385 (these courts have ‘those powers which are essential to
the administration of justice and the maintenance of the rule of law’).
5. Criminal Lawyers’ Association, above n. 3, paras. 32-33. For a more
detailed description of Superior Courts in Canada and their role, see
T.C.W. Farrow, Civil Justice, Privatization, and Democracy (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press) (2014), at 13-50.
6. Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26, s 35. See also Ontario (Attorney
General) v. Pembina Exploration Canada Ltd., [1989] 1 SCR 206, para.
14, 57 DLR (4th) 710.
Supreme Court in civil cases, and the Court only grants
leave to appeal in cases that raise issues of public or
national importance.7 As a result, many provincial
appellate courts have primary responsibility for the
interpretation of many province-specific procedural
laws and systems.
Given that each province is constitutionally responsible
for administering civil justice, provincial governments
diverge in their response to and engagement with issues
of access to justice. As we discuss below, Canada faces
an access to justice crisis, and coordination between
provinces is needed to implement a countrywide access
to justice strategy.
1.2 Canada’s Access to Justice Crisis and
Response to the Global Financial Crisis
Much has been written on the state of access to justice
in Canada.8 The Supreme Court recently diagnosed
Canada’s problem: ‘Ensuring access to justice is the
greatest challenge to the rule of law in Canada today …
ordinary Canadians cannot afford to access the adjudica-
tion of civil disputes.’9 While it is beyond the scope of
this article to detail exhaustively the access to justice
challenges in Canada, some discussion of this issue is
necessary to contextualise the need for affordable and
simplified justice solutions. At the end of this section,
we also briefly consider the impact of the global finan-
cial crisis and austerity measures on these access issues
in Canada.
We note at the outset that there is a major lack of empir-
ical data on issues of access to justice in Canada, which
is a shared concern internationally as well. As such,
research on civil justice in Canada is not without signifi-
cant challenges. As several recent reports have indica-
ted, there is a significant and growing need for evi-
dence-based research in all areas of civil and family jus-
7. Supreme Court Act, above n. 6, s 40(1); MacDonald v. City of Mon-
treal [1986] 1 SCR 460, para. 141, 27 DLR (4th) 321. See also R v.
Shea, 2010 SCC 26, para. 9, [2010] 2 SCR 17.
8. See e.g. Canadian Bar Association Access to Justice Committee, Reach-
ing Equal Justice Report: An Invitation to Envision and Act (Ottawa:
Canadian Bar Association) (2013), available at: <www. cba. org/ CBA/
equaljustice/ secure_ pdf/ EqualJusticeFinalReport -eng. pdf>; Canadian
Forum on Civil Justice, The Costs of Justice: Weighing the Costs of Fair
& Effective Resolution to Legal Problems (Toronto: Canadian Forum on
Civil Justice) (2012), available at: <www. cfcj -fcjc. org/ sites/ default/ files/
docs/ 2012/ CURA_ background_ doc. pdf>; Action Committee on Access
to Justice in Civil and Family Matter, Access to Civil & Family Justice: A
Roadmap for Change (Ottawa: Action Committee on Access to Justice
in Civil and Family Matter) (2013), available at: <www. cfcj -fcjc. org/
sites/ default/ files/ docs/ 2013/ AC_ Report_ English_ Final. pdf>; T.C.W.
Farrow, ‘What is Access to Justice?’, 51(3) Osgoode Hall Law Journal
957 (2014). For more general resources, see Canadian Forum on Civil
Justice, available at: <www. cfcj -fcjc. org/>.
9. Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, paras. 1, 24, [2014] 1 SCR 87.
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tice.10 Nevertheless, it is clear that the growing gap
between legal needs and affordable legal services
remains the most pressing barrier to civil justice in our
country. The Canadian Bar Association, relying on
empirical studies,11 concluded in a recent report that
‘over the course of a lifetime almost everyone will con-
front a justiciable problem’.12 Yet, increasing legal costs
have made legal services inaccessible to many Canadi-
ans.13 Only 6.7% of people with legal issues use formal
court or tribunal systems.14 On average, lawyers in Can-
ada bill from $218 to $394 an hour, depending on the
seniority of counsel and the jurisdiction of practice.15 A
3-day civil trial may cost over $60,000.16 In comparison,
the 2011 average family income after tax in Canada was
$79,600 and the average individual income after tax was
$31,400.17 The prevalence of everyday legal challenges
and the unaffordability of legal services underscore the
increasing need for access to less expensive simplified
procedures.
The complexities and time-intensive nature of even
basic legal procedures also plague Canadian civil justice.
The Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and
Family Matters (‘Action Committee’) explained that
‘formal procedures seem to grow ever more complicated
and disproportionate to the needs of the litigants and
the matters involved’.18 One judge, writing extra-judi-
cially, commented that the rapid decline of the tradi-
10. See e.g. Civil Non-Family Cases Filed in the Supreme Court of BC:
Research Results and Lessons Learned, A report prepared by Focus
Consultants for the Canadian Forum on Civil Justice (Victoria, BC:
Canadian Forum on Civil Justice) (2015), at 24-31; Action Committee
on Access to Justice in Civil and Family Matters, above n. 8, at 23. See
also M. Jerry McHale (for Canadian Forum on Civil Justice), ‘Access to
Justice Reform and the Data Deficit – Some Lessons Learned’, SLAW,
25 November 2015, available at: <www. slaw. ca/ 2015/ 11/ 25/ access -to
-justice -reform -and -the -data -deficit -some -lessons -learned/>; J. Currie,
‘Access to Justice, Access to Clients: Methodological Challenges in Civil
Justice Research’, A2J Blog, 18 February 2015, available at: <www. cfcj -
fcjc. org/ a2jblog/ access -to -justice -access -to -clients -methodological -
challenges -in -civil -justice -research>.
11. See A. Currie, The Legal Problems of Everyday Life: The Nature, Extent
and Consequences of Justiciable Problems Experienced by Canadians
(2009), available at: <www. justice. gc. ca/ eng/ rp -pr/ csj -sjc/ jsp -sjp/ rr07_
la1 -rr07_ aj1/ rr07_ la1. pdf>. See also Y. Taddese, ‘Legal Pains: The Cost
of Justice Includes Physical Health’, Canadian Lawyer Magazine, 15
March 2015, available at: <www. canadianlawyermag. com/ legalfeeds/
2587/ legal -pains -the -cost -of -justice -includes -physical -health. html>;
‘Everyday Legal Problems and the Cost of Justice in Canada’, A2J Blog,
12 March 2015, available at: <www. cfcj -fcjc. org/ a2jblog/ everyday -legal
-problems -and -the -cost -of -justice -in -canada>.
12. Canadian Bar Association Access to Justice Committee, above n. 8, at 8.
13. Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and Family Matters,
above n. 8, at 3.
14. ‘Everyday Legal Problems and the Cost of Justice in Canada’, A2J Blog,
12 March 2015, available at: <www. cfcj -fcjc. org/ a2jblog/ everyday -legal
-problems -and -the -cost -of -justice -in -canada>.
15. M. McKiernan, ‘The Going Rate’, Canadian Lawyer Magazine, 33 at 35
(2014), available at: <www. canadianlawyermag. com/ images/ stories/
pdfs/ Surveys/ 2014/ cljune14legalfees. pdf>.
16. Ibid., at 36. See also T. Tyler, ‘A 3-Day Trial Likely to Cost You
$60,000’, Toronto Star, 3 March 2007, available at: <www. thestar.
com/ news/ 2007/ 03/ 03/ a_ 3day_ trial_ likely_ to_ cost_ you_ 60000. html>.
Of course, the costs of legal services greatly vary from province to prov-
ince and city to city.
17. Statistics Canada, ‘Average Income after Tax by Economic Family Types
(2007-2011)’, 27 June 2013, available at: <www. statcan. gc. ca/ tables -
tableaux/ sum -som/ l01/ cst01/ famil21a -eng. htm>.
tional trial is often attributed to the ‘significant time
delay and cost associated with litigation process’.19 The
Ontario Civil Justice Review in 1995 further suggested
that ‘[f]rom wasteful motions through endless discovery
to long waiting for pre-trials, trials and appeals, the
public perceives the civil justice system to be out of con-
trol’.20 These comments are as relevant today, as they
were 20 years ago.
A consequence of Canada’s inaccessible civil justice sys-
tem has been the increase of self-represented litigants.
Nearly 50% of those surveyed in Canada in 2008 repor-
ted that they try to solve their legal problems on their
own, without resort to legal advice.21 Thus, when issues
materialise in court, these individuals often go it alone.
A recent study on self-represented litigants in Canada
concluded that, in some circumstances, self-represented
litigants ‘may amount to more than half of the litigants
in today’s courtrooms’.22
Although there is a deficiency of empirical data on the
incidence of self-representation, a study from British
Columbia demonstrates an upward trend. From 1999 to
2001, between 5.5% and 14.2% of litigants in the Brit-
ish Columbia trial court were self-represented. By 2011,
21% of litigants in general civil matters were without
representation.23 In other courts, particularly in the
family law context, the numbers are typically much
higher. The most common reason that individuals
choose to self-represent is their inability to afford legal
counsel.24 Despite valuable efforts taking place in Cana-
da to address this issue,25 self-representation remains a
significant concern.
18. Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and Family Matters,
above n. 8, at 7.
19. Honourable C.L. Campbell, ‘Managing the Civil Process’, 32(2) Advo-
cates’ Society Journal 9, at 9 (2013).
20. Honourable R.A. Blair and S. Lang, Civil Justice Review: First Report
(Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario) (1995), at 126, available at:
<www. attorneygeneral. jus. gov. on. ca/ english/ about/ pubs/ cjr/
firstreport/ default. asp>.
21. A. Currie, ‘Self-Helpers Need Help Too’, 9 August 2010, available at:
<www. lawforlife. org. uk/ research -and -theory/ self -helpers -need -help -
too/>; Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and Family Mat-
ters, above n. 8, at 4.
22. T.C.W. Farrow et al., ‘Addressing the Needs of Self-Represented Liti-
gants in the Canadian Justice System: A White Paper Prepared for the
Association of Canadian Court Administrators’, 27 March 2012, at 16,
available at: <www. cfcj -fcjc. org/ sites/ default/ files/ docs/ 2013/ Address
ing%20the%20Needs%20of%20SRLs%20ACCA%20White%20Paper
%20March%202012%20Final%20Revised%20Version. pdf>.
23. J. MacFarlane, The National Self-Represented Litigants Project: Identi-
fying and Meeting the Needs of Self-Represented Litigants (Final
Report) (Kingsville, ON: Treasurer’s Advisory Group on Access to Justice
(TAG) Working Group Report) (2013), at 34-5, available at: <www. lsuc.
on. ca/ uploadedFiles/ For_ the_ Public/ About_ the_ Law_ Society/
Convocation_ Decisions/ 2014/ Self -represented_ project. pdf>. In foreclo-
sure proceedings in British Columbia, 19% of litigants are unrepresen-
ted, and in bankruptcy proceedings, 34% are without counsel (Ibid.).
Macfarlane reports similar numbers of self-represented litigants in
Alberta and Ontario (Ibid.).
24. Ibid., at 39.
25. See e.g. Ibid.; R. Mendleson, ‘Can’t Afford a Lawyer? How Courtroom
Innovations Help Self-Represented Litigants’, Toronto Star, 21 March
2015, available at: <www. thestar. com/ news/ crime/ 2015/ 03/ 21/ cant -
afford -a -lawyer -how -courtroom -innovations -help -self -represented -
litigants. html> (describing a programme where law students coach self-
represented litigants in Windsor, Ontario).
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The limited availability of publically funded legal aid
services has further exacerbated the growing civil justice
gap in Canada. Direct government spending on legal aid
services has declined by over 20% since the early
1990s.26 This decline has coincided with decreases in
funding for legal aid by the federal government.27 Even
where funding is available, legal aid is only available to
those whose incomes are well below average.28 For
example, in Manitoba, free legal assistance is only avail-
able to individuals whose gross annual income is
$14,000 or under.29 In Nova Scotia, legal aid is only
available to those who are on or who can qualify for
Income Assistance.30 Furthermore, only limited types of
legal services are available through legal aid.31
Nevertheless, there are some positive trends in Canadi-
an legal aid funding. While overall spending is down
since the mid-1990s, government spending on legal aid
funding increased by 13.6% from 2007-2008 to
2011-2012.32 In 2014, e.g. the Ontario government com-
mitted close to $100 million to legal aid, increasing the
threshold for legal aid eligibility for the first time since
1996.33 Furthermore, while the 2015 federal budget
offered little increased justice spending,34 the 2014 fed-
eral budget included increased funding for an Aborigi-
nal Justice Strategy and the increased appointment of
judges in Alberta and Québec to ‘ensure that cases are
heard in a timely manner’.35 In addition, much justice-
related funding (infrastructure, legal aid, administra-
26. A. Currie, ‘The State of Civil Legal Aid in Canada: By the Numbers in
2011-2012’, A2J Blog, 13 May 2013, available at: <www. cfcj -fcjc. org/
commentary/ the -state -of -civil -legal -aid -in -canada -by -the -numbers -in
-2011 -2012#sthash. mruQ1mAj. dpuf>.
27. Canadian Bar Association Access to Justice Committee, above n. 8, at 9.
28. Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and Family Matters,
above n. 8, at 3-4.
29. Legal Aid Manitoba, ‘Who Qualifies Financially’, 19 March 2015, avail-
able at: <www. legalaid. mb. ca/ getting -legal -aid/ who -qualifies -financial
ly>.
30. Nova Scotia Legal Aid Commission, ‘Do I Qualify?’, 2010, available at:
<www. nslegalaid. ca/ qualify. php>. Income assistance is Nova Scotia’s
welfare programme. See ‘Income Assistance’, 23 October 2013, availa-
ble at: <http:// novascotia. ca/ coms/ employment/ income_ assistance/
index. html>.
31. Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and Family Matters,
above n. 8, at 3-4.
32. Currie, above n. 26.
33. Ministry of the Attorney General, News Release, ‘Giving More Ontari-
ans Access to Affordable Legal Services: Province Doubling Number of
People Eligible for Legal Aid’, 30 October 2014, available at: <http://
news. ontario. ca/ mag/ en/ 2014/ 10/ giving -more -ontarians -access -to -
affordable -legal -services. html>. See also C. Goar, ‘Against All Odds,
Legal Aid Ontario Is Getting Better: Goar’, Toronto Star, 26 March
2015, available at: <www. thestar. com/ opinion/ commentary/ 2015/ 03/
26/ against -all -odds -legal -aid -ontario -is -getting -better -goar. html>.
34. J. Ling, ‘Budget 2015: Little for Rising Justice Costs’, National Maga-
zine, 21 April 2015, available at: <www. nationalmagazine. ca/ Blog/ April
-2015/ Budget -2015 -Little -for -rising -justice -costs. aspx>.
35. S. Bell, ‘Justice Programs in the 2014 Federal Budget’, Precedent Maga-
zine, 18 February 2014, available at: <http:// lawandstyle. ca/ law/ 2014 -
federal -budget -justice -programs/>; ‘Providing Additional Judges’
(2014), available at: <http:// actionplan. gc. ca/ en/ initiative/ providing -
additional -judges>; C. Santry, ‘$4.4 Million in Budget for Six New Judg-
es’, Canadian Lawyer Magazine, 12 February 2014, available at: <www.
canadianlawyermag. com/ legalfeeds/ 1936/ 4 -4 -million -in -budget -for -six
-new -judges. html>.
tion, etc.) comes from provincial government budgets,
which are different across the country.
In the face of these recent developments, it is unclear
whether underfunding of Canadian legal services relates
to the pressures of post-financial crisis global austerity.
Although austerity is not a primary focus of this article,
a few brief observations will help add context to the
Canadian position. Many of Canada’s access to justice
challenges pre-date the global financial crisis, and Cana-
da’s emergence from the global financial crisis is often
‘deemed a success story’.36 The federal government was
in a strong financial position at the outset of the global
financial crisis – Canada’s government posted a budget
surplus in each year from 1997 to 2008.37 Moreover, for
various reasons,38 Canada’s banks were considered more
resilient to the crisis than banks in other countries.39
Canada did not fully embrace austerity measures at the
outset of the crisis. Based partly on the factors men-
tioned above and to avoid slow economic growth, the
government’s ‘approach to austerity appears compara-
tively more balanced than that which can be observed
elsewhere’.40 Through the past several years, Canada’s
federal debt has increased to over $600 billion,41 and
many provincial legislatures have also accumulated sig-
nificant debts.42
While many have heralded Canada’s emergence from
the global financial crisis, other commentators and
organisations have been more critical of Canada’s eco-
nomic outlook and policy.43 Since posting consecutive
deficits in the post-recession period, the federal govern-
ment, which radically changed (from Conservative to
Liberal) in Canada’s recent October 2015 federal elec-
tion, continues to be committed ultimately to balancing
the budget – although with promises of major increases
36. I. Roberge, ‘New Development: Canada’s Cutback Management’, 34(2)
Public Money & Management 131, at 132 (2014).
37. For a detailed examination of how Canada achieved its strong financial
position, see D.R. Henderson, ‘Canada’s Budget Triumph’, 23(3) Jour-
nal of Applied Corporate Finance 8 (2011).
38. G. Isfeld, ‘Canada’s Banks Shake Off Global Sector Crisis’, National
Post, 10 October 2012, available at: <http:// business. financialpost. com/
news/ fp -street/ canadas -banks -shake -off -global -sector -crisis>.
39. K. Lynch, ‘Avoiding the Financial Crisis: Lessons from Canada’, Policy
Options, May 2010, available at: <http:// policyoptions. irpp. org/ issues/
the -fault -lines -of -federalism/ avoiding -the -financial -crisis -lessons -from -
canada/>. Although, the banks did receive a large amount of funding
(around $114 billion) from the federal government during the crisis. See
J. Greenwood, ‘Was Canadian Banks’ ‘Secret’ Bailout Really a Secret?’,
National Post, 30 April 2012, available at: <http:// business.
financialpost. com/ uncategorized/ canadas -secret -bank -bailout>.
40. Roberge, above n. 36, at 132.
41. Office the Parliamentary Budget Officer, ‘Pre-Budget Outlook’, 24 April
2015, available at: <www. pbo -dpb. gc. ca/ files/ files/ PreBudgetOutlook
2015. pdf>.
42. Roberge, above n. 36, at 133-4.
43. See e.g. M.G. Cohen, J. Stanford & S. Gindin, ‘A Canadian Dimension
Roundtable on the Global Economic Crisis’, 46(1) Canadian Dimension
12 (2012); G. Isfeld, ‘OECD Slashes Canada’s Economic Forecast for
2015, but Gives Hope of Growth to Come’, National Post, 3 June 2015,
available at: <http:// business. financialpost. com/ news/ economy/ cana
das -economy -to -restart -growth -for -the -rest -of -2015 -reports>;
G. Isfeld, ‘As IMF Sounds Alarm on Canadian Economy, Policymakers
Told to Keep Supporting Growth’, National Post, 16 April 2013, availa-
ble at: <http:// business. financialpost. com/ news/ economy/ imf -canada -
economy>.
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in near-term infrastructure and public sector
spending.44 Many people are of the view that the former
government’s ‘cutback process’ was very much ‘mired
in secrecy’,45 and the ongoing impact of many former
cuts cannot be determined at this time.46 Some of the
funding cuts related to justice programme grants and
contributions and a cut of roughly 20% of the Depart-
ment of Justice’s research funding.47 Ultimately, the
former government’s response to the crisis was uneven.
Although early indications regarding an increased feder-
al focus on and support for some areas of justice services
and research are very positive, it is too early to tell how
the new government will approach all of these issues.48
Without further empirical study, which is not the pur-
pose of this article, we are not in a position to comment
more broadly on the impact of austerity measures to
Canadian civil justice.
Whether tied to austerity measures or not, courts con-
tinue to identify concerns regarding the state of civil
justice in the country.49 In Trial Lawyers Association of
British Columbia v. British Columbia (Attorney Gener-
al),50 a majority of the Supreme Court struck down reg-
ulations that imposed additional costs on litigants. In
British Columbia, litigants were charged $500 for trials
lasting 4-10 days, and a further $800 for each additional
trial day beyond 10 days.51 These fees were premised on
two rationales: ‘to provide an incentive for efficient use
of court time … [and] to provide sufficient revenue to
offset the costs of providing civil justice’ in the prov-
ince.52 Although these fees were in place since 1998, the
44. For the Liberal government’s basic economic platform, which is current-
ly being fully implemented after the recent election, see e.g. Liberal Par-
ty of Canada, Real Change: A New Plan for a Strong Middle Class
(Ottawa: Liberal Party of Canada) (2015), at 12, available at: <https://
www. liberal. ca/ files/ 2015/ 10/ A -new -plan -for -a -strong -middle -class -
BW -1. pdf>.
45. Roberge, above n. 36, at 133.
46. L. Whittington, ‘Without a Safety Net: Canadians Still in Dark about
Budget Cuts, Says Parliamentary Watchdog’, Toronto Star, 10 Decem-
ber 2013, available at: <www. thestar. com/ news/ canada/ 2013/ 12/ 10/
without_ a_ safety_ net_ canadians_ still_ in_ dark_ about_ budget_ cuts_ says_
parliamentary_ watchdog. html>; C. Kenny, ‘Harper’s Secret Budget Cuts
Undermine Canada’s Democracy’, Huffington Post, 31 January 2015,
available at: <www. huffingtonpost. ca/ colin -kenny/ canada -budget -
cuts_ b_ 6249122. html>.
47. See C. Santry, ‘Feds Chopping Funding for Some Justice Programs by
20%’, Canadian Lawyer Magazine, 3 April 2013, available at: <www.
canadianlawyermag. com/ legalfeeds/ 1397/ feds -chopping -funding -for -
some -justice -programs -by -20. html>; D. Beeby, ‘Justice Canada Chops
Research Budget by $1.2-Million’, Globe and Mail, 12 May 2014, avail-
able at: <www. theglobeandmail. com/ news/ politics/ justice -canada -cho
ps -research -budget -by -12 -million/ article18598170/>.
48. See Government of Canada, available at: <https:// www. canada. ca/ en.
html>; Liberal Party of Canada, available at: <https:// www. liberal. ca/>.
See further Liberal Party, above n. 44.
49. See e.g. Hryniak, above n. 9; Letang v. Hertz Canada Ltd., 2015 ONSC
72, para. 18, [2015] OJ No 60 (QL); York University v. Michael Marki-
cevic, 2013 ONSC 4311, paras. 2, 14, [2013] OJ No 3014 (QL); Mal-
ton v. Attia, 2013 ABQB 642, paras. 191, 90 Alta LR (5th) 1 (‘It is a
trite observation to say that cost represents a potential bar to Canadian
courts and the justice they offer’); Javitz v. BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc et
al., 2011 ONSC 1332, paras. 28, 105 OR (3d) 279.
50. 2014 SCC 59 [2014] 3 SCR 31 [Trial Lawyers Association].
51. Ibid., para. 10.
52. Ibid., para. 51.
British Columbia government increased these fees in
2010.53
The Supreme Court held that, despite exemptions for
‘indigent’ and ‘impoverished’ people, these fees uncon-
stitutionally restricted access to Section 96 Superior
Courts. The Court affirmed that provincial govern-
ments have legislative authority to impose hearing fees,
but that this power is not unbounded.54 The Court con-
cluded that there must be ‘enough judicial discretion to
waive hearing fees in any case where [the fees] would
effectively prevent access to the courts …’55 In this case,
the hearing fees prevented a middle-class family from
accessing the courts and did ‘not promote efficient use
of court time; at best [the fee] promote[d] less use of
court time’.56
This case is particularly relevant to Canada’s access to
justice challenges and the potential government austeri-
ty measures that impact the justice system. While only
British Columbia, Yukon, and the Northwest Territo-
ries have incremental court hearing fees, other provinces
levy fees for court time.57 The Supreme Court has
clearly signalled to provincial governments that legisla-
tion limiting public access to courts must be reasonable
and flexible. As provinces may look for ways to recoup
the costs of administering justice, the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Trial Lawyers Association cautions govern-
ments from adopting measures that may ‘effectively
den[y] people the right to take their cases to court’.58
1.3 Overarching Principles of Canadian Civil
Justice
Before detailing some of the specific programmes and
simplified procedures across Canada, it is important to
discuss essential principles that are infused in all Cana-
dian procedural laws: efficiency and proportionality. In
Ontario, for example, the Rules of Civil Procedure must
‘be liberally construed to secure the just, most expedi-
tious and least expensive determination of every civil
proceeding on its merits’.59 The Ontario Rules also
require that ‘the court shall make orders and give direc-
tions that are proportionate to the importance and com-
plexity of the issues, and to the amount involved, in the
proceeding’.60 Most provinces in Canada have rules
similar to these that promote efficiency and proportion-
53. Ibid., para. 9.
54. Ibid., paras. 18-23, 43.
55. Ibid., para. 48.
56. Ibid., para. 63.
57. Vilardell v. Dunham (2012), BCSC 748, para. 95, [2012] BCJ No 1016
(QL). See e.g. Trial Lawyer’s Association, above n. 50 (Factum of the
Intervener, Attorney General of Alberta, paras. 18-22; Factum of the
Intervener, Attorney General of Ontario, paras. 9-13). See also J. Mid-
dlemiss, ‘Court Fees Face SCC Scrutiny’, Canadian Lawyer Magazine, 3
March 2014, available at: <www. canadianlawyermag. com/ 5034/ Court
-fees -face -SCC -scrutiny. html>.
58. Trial Lawyers Association, above n. 50, para. 40.
59. Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194, r 1.04 (1) [Ontario
Rules].
60. Ibid., r 1.04(1.1).
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ality.61 In the absence of such rules, provincial courts
have readily adopted these concepts.62
Efficiency aims to ‘improve timeliness and affordability
in the civil justice system’.63 Proportionality, on the oth-
er hand, is a normative concept – while it is difficult to
define,64 proportionality requires litigants, at a mini-
mum, to evaluate a claim and act in accordance with the
importance, complexity, and value of the case.65 In Hry-
niak v. Mauldin, the Supreme Court addressed the need
for a ‘culture shift’ in civil litigation that ‘entails simpli-
fying pre-trial procedures and moving the emphasis
away from the conventional trial in favour of propor-
tional procedures tailored to the needs of the particular
case’.66 While the Canadian civil justice system is
‘premised upon the value that the process of adjudica-
tion must be fair and just … [t]he proportionality prin-
ciple means that the best forum for resolving a dispute is
not always that with the most painstaking procedure’.67
Proportionality has taken hold in many other
countries,68 and the Supreme Court’s recent empha-
sis on this principle has the potential to impact the
entire litigation process. In just over a year, lower courts
have cited Hryniak and proportionality in the following
divergent contexts: whether to hear a matter under sim-
plified rules of procedure;69 whether to order the
exchange of affidavits prior to a summary judgement
motion in the context of a class action;70 whether to ter-
minate child support;71 whether to order the review and
production of sound recordings in a competition case;72
in fixing the amount of costs ordered;73 and in a will
61. Both principles of proportionality and efficiency have been codified in
Ontario, British Columbia, Québec, New Brunswick, Manitoba, and Sas-
katchewan. See Ibid., rr 1.04(1), 1.04(1.1) (Ontario); Supreme Court
Civil Rules, BC Reg 168/2009, r 1-3(2) [British Columbia Rules]; Code
of Civil Procedure, Arts. 2, 4.2 (Québec); Rules of Court, NB Reg
82-73, rr 1.02.1, 1.03(2) [New Brunswick Rules]; Court of Queen’s
Bench Rules, Man Reg 553/88, rr 1.04(1), 20A(5) [Manitoba Rules]
(Manitoba has only recognised proportionality explicitly in the context
of expedited actions); Saskatchewan, The Queen’s Bench Rules, r 1-3
[Saskatchewan Rules].
62. Judicial interpretations of civil procedure rules have imported concepts
of proportionality in Alberta, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and Labrador,
and Prince Edward Island. See Medicine Shoppe Canada Inc. v. Devc-
hand (2012), ABQB 375, 541 AR 312, para. 11; Saturley v. CIBC World
Markets Inc (2011), NSSC 4, 297 NSR (2d) 371, para. 12; Szeto v.
Dwyer (2010), NLCA 36, 297 Nfld & PEIR 311, paras. 53-55; O’Hallor-
an v. Watterson et.ors, 2015 PESC 3, para. 13, 30 MPLR (5th) 1.
63. T.C.W. Farrow, ‘Proportionality: A Cultural Revolution’, 1 Journal of
Civil Litigation and Practice 151, at 153 (2012).
64. D.E. Short and R.A. Gold, ‘Proportionality in Theory and Practice’, in
T.L. Archibald and R.S. Echlin (eds.), Annual Review of Civil Litigation:
2014 (Toronto: Carswell) (2014), 373 at 386.
65. Farrow, above n. 63, at 153-4.
66. Hryniak, above n. 9, para. 2.
67. Ibid., paras. 23, 28.
68. Farrow, above n. 63, at 152; J. Walker and L. Sossin, Civil Litigation
(Toronto: Irwin Law) (2010), at 247-9.
69. Rochelle et al. v. The Rural Municipality of St Clements et al., 2014
MBCA 102, 310 Man R (2d) 202.
70. Fehr v. Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada (2014), ONSC 2183, 240
ACWS (3d) 324.
71. Tarlton v. Jackson, 2014 NSSC 231, 346 NSR (2d) 64.
72. The Commissioner of Competition v. Reliance Comfort Limited Part-
nership, 2014 CACT 9 [2014] CCTD No 9 (QL).
73. Pinto v. Kaur et al., 2015 ONSC 1356 [2015] OJ No 969 (QL).
challenge proceeding.74 Proportionality infuses the sim-
plified procedures discussed below, and courts will
remain vigilant to ensure that this principle is respected.
2 Simplified and Summary
Procedures in Canada
Given the Supreme Court’s emphasis on a culture shift
in civil litigation, there is a growing recognition of the
importance of simplified procedures. In fact, the Action
Committee listed ‘simplify, make coherent, proportional
and sustainable’ as one of its guiding principles for
change in Canadian civil justice.75 In this section, we
outline some of the simplified and summary procedures
found across the country.
2.1 Simplified Procedures and Fast Track
Litigation
The implementation of ‘simplified’ or ‘expedited’ pro-
cedures across several jurisdictions has reduced the cost
and length of a tradition civil trial. Simplified proce-
dures are a specific set of less complex, and expedited
rules that automatically apply to actions for less than a
certain monetary amount.76 In British Columbia, the
simplified procedure is known as ‘Fast Track Litiga-
tion’, and these British Columbia procedures also apply
when the trial of an action can be completed in 3 days.77
Former Chief Justice of Ontario Warren Winkler
described the simplified procedures in Ontario as ‘per-
haps the most successful recent innovation in our tradi-
tional court system’.78 Even prior to the 2010 expansion
of the monetary threshold for the simplified rules in
Ontario, over 60% of civil suits proceeded under the
simplified rules.79
There are nuances to each provincial simplified proce-
dure regime, and it is not our goal to detail the specifics
of each. Generally, however, the provincial schemes
74. Re Estate of Ireni Traitses, deceased, 2014 ONSC 2102, 239 ACWS
(3d) 543.
75. Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and Family Matters,
above n. 8, at 6, 8.
76. Each jurisdiction has different monetary thresholds. In Ontario, British
Columbia, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Nova Scotia, actions for
$100,000 or less fall under the simplified rules. See Ontario Rules,
above n. 59, r 76.02; British Columbia Rules, above n. 61, Part 15;
Manitoba Rules, above n. 61, r 20A(2); Saskatchewan Rules, above n.
61, r 8-2(1); Nova Scotia, Nova Scotia Civil Procedure Rules, rr 57-58
[Nova Scotia Rules]. In New Brunswick, simplified procedures apply to
claims for $75,000 or less. See New Brunswick Rules, above n. 61, r
79.05. The two lowest monetary thresholds for the application of sim-
plified procedures are in Prince Edward Island ($25,000 or less) and
Newfoundland and Labrador ($15,000 or less). See P.E. Island, Annota-
ted Rules of Civil Procedure, r 75.1 [Prince Edward Island Rules]; New-
foundland and Labrador, Rules of the Supreme Court, r 17A.09 [New-
foundland Rules]. In Québec, the ‘Court of Québec has jurisdiction to
the exclusion of the Superior Court’ in matters where less than $70,000
is claimed. See Code of Civil Procedure, Art. 34.
77. British Columbia Rules, above n. 61, r 15-1(1)(b).
78. Honourable W.K. Winkler, ‘The Vanishing Trial’, 27(2) Advocates’ Soci-
ety Journal 3 (2008), para. 18 (QL).
79. Honourable W.K. Winkler, ‘Professionalism and Proportionality’, 27(4)
Advocates’ Society Journal 6, at 6 (2009).
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share several common characteristics. First, most sim-
plified procedures limit the amount of time available for
examinations for discovery.80 Civil trials often get
delayed as a result of protracted examinations of wit-
nesses. Therefore, these rules prevent costly examina-
tions and constrain discovery so that the purpose
remains ‘to learn and discover the opposing party’s posi-
tion on the key issue in dispute’.81 For example, in Mani-
toba, no party may conduct an examination for discov-
ery under the expedited rules on an action worth less
than $50,000 without leave of a judge.82 Further, on an
action under the expedited procedure that is worth
$50,000 or more, examinations for discovery cannot
exceed 3 hours.83
Second, several of the simplified procedure regimes
require parties to attend pre-trial or case planning con-
ferences.84 These case management measures ensure
that matters are scheduled efficiently and that the issues
in dispute are focused. In Ontario, the rules mandate a
pre-trial conference at least 45 days before the sched-
uled trial date.85 In British Columbia, a case planning
conference must be completed before a party can serve a
notice of application or an affidavit supporting the
application on another party to the action.86
Third, special fixed costs rules are often associated with
simplified procedures.87 These specified costs incenti-
vise the parties to complete the action on time to keep
costs low and predictable. An example of a fixed costs
system is found in Saskatchewan. The Saskatchewan
Queen’s Bench Rules of Court provide that a successful
party under the expedited procedures is entitled to fixed
costs if the hearing of the trial is less than 3 days.88 In
fact, in New Brunswick, for example, the rules impose
additional cost consequences on a party that improperly
fails to use the simplified procedures.89
While the simplified procedural schemes are a signifi-
cant step towards reducing the complexity and cost of
civil proceedings, some have critiqued the way these
80. See e.g. Ontario Rules, above n. 59, r 76.04; British Columbia Rules,
above n. 61, r 15-1(11); Saskatchewan Rules, above n. 61, r 8-7; Mani-
toba Rules, above n. 61, rr 20A(39)-(41); Nova Scotia Rules, above n.
76, r 57.10. In fact, in New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island, discov-
ery is not allowed in a simplified action, unless otherwise permitted by
the court. See New Brunswick Rules, above n. 61, r 79.07; Prince
Edward Island Rules, above n. 76, r 75.1.04.
81. N. Champion, ‘Litigation Simplified: The New Rule 76’, Paper Delivered
at ‘Your First Civil Trial’ Conference, Ontario Bar Association Continuing
Professional Development, Toronto, Ontario, 8 March 2013, at 7
(unpublished) (emphasis in original).
82. Manitoba Rules, above n. 61, r 20A(40).
83. Ibid., r 20A(41). Of course, the case management judge has discretion
under the rules to extend an examination for discovery where it is
appropriate. See Ibid., r 20(A)(41)(b).
84. See e.g. British Columbia Rules, above n. 61, r 15-1(7); Saskatchewan
Rules, above n. 61, r 8-8; Manitoba Rules, above n. 61, 20A(9); Prince
Edward Island Rules, above n. 76, r 75.1.09; Ontario Rules, above n.
59, r 76.10(1).
85. Ibid.
86. British Columbia Rules, above n. 61, r 15-1(7).
87. See e.g. Ibid., r 15-1(15); New Brunswick Rules, above n. 61, r 79.11
(which limits the scale of costs that can be awarded in an action under
the simplified rules); Saskatchewan Rules, above n. 61, r 8-11.
88. Ibid.
89. New Brunswick Rules, above n. 61, r 79.12.
procedures categorise cases. Janet Walker and Lorne
Sossin write that:
drawing bright procedural lines based solely on the
damages claimed in civil litigation turns a private cal-
culation (how individuals quantify harm or loss) into
a public calculation (how the civil justice system allo-
cates rights to discovery and cross-examination),
without reference to other indicia of the public inter-
est.90
Alberta’s recently enacted rules of civil procedure
acknowledge this critique and the limited utility of dam-
ages claimed as a sorting mechanism. Rather than sort-
ing cases by the amount claimed, Alberta cases must be
categorised as either ‘standard’ or ‘complex’.91 This
classification is made on the basis of a number of factors,
including the amount claimed, the complexity of the
issues, the number of parties, and the importance of the
issues.92 Proportionate procedures apply to each type of
action.
2.2 Summary Judgement and Special Cases
Simplified procedures apply to the conduct of the entire
litigation process, but there are several ways to resolve a
dispute before it proceeds too far through this process.
A summary judgement motion is one of these mecha-
nisms. On a summary judgement motion, the motion
judge can resolve the claim by looking at the merits of
the action disclosed in the pleadings, affidavits, and
cross-examined affidavits tendered by the parties.93 The
action is typically disposed of on a ‘paper record’ rather
than through viva voce evidence.94 It is an ‘important
tool for enhancing access to justice because it can pro-
vide a cheaper, faster alternative to a full trial’.95 Every
province, other than Québec, has a summary judgement
procedure.96
The question remains: when is summary judgement
available? In Hryniak v. Mauldin, the Supreme Court
set out the governing framework. This case was decided
in the context of the Ontario rules, although the Court
was clear that ‘the values and principles underlying its
interpretation are of general application’.97 In Ontario,
Rule 20.04 states that the court shall grant summary
judgement if ‘the court is satisfied that there is no genu-
90. Walker and Sossin, above n. 68, at 221.
91. Alberta Rules of Court, Alta Reg 124/2010, r 4.3 [Alberta Rules].
92. Ibid., r 4.3(2).
93. Walker and Sossin, above n. 68, at 210. As we explain, the summary
judgement procedure in British Columbia is more limited than the pro-
cedure in Ontario. See text accompanying n. 90-93.
94. Walker and Sossin, above n. 68, at 210. However, in some jurisdictions,
viva voce evidence may be allowed on a motion for summary judge-
ment. See e.g. Ontario Rules, above n. 59, r 20.04 (2.2); Hryniak,
above n. 9, paras. 61-65.
95. Ibid., para. 34.
96. See e.g. Ontario Rules, above n. 59, r 20; Manitoba Rules, above n. 61,
r 20; Prince Edward Island Rules, above n. 76, r 20. Québec has a pro-
cedure that is similar to summary judgement, although it is not as broad
as the summary judgement rules in other provinces. See Code of Civil
Procedure, Arts. 54.1-54.3, 165(4); Hryniak, above n. 9, para. 34, n. 4.
97. Hryniak, above n. 9, para. 35.
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ine issue requiring a trial’.98 The Supreme Court held
that there will be no issue requiring a trial when:
the [summary judgment] process (1) allows the judge
to make the necessary findings of fact, (2) allows the
judge to apply the law to the facts, and (3) is a pro-
portionate, more expeditious and less expensive
means to achieve a just result.99
In Ontario, a motion judge can also weigh evidence,
evaluate the credibility of a deponent, and draw reasona-
ble inferences from the evidence ‘unless it is in the
interest of justice for such powers to be exercised only at
a trial’.100 On this question, the Supreme Court held
that ‘[i]n practice, whether it is against the “interest of
justice” to use [these powers] will often coincide with
whether there is a “genuine issue requiring a trial”’.
Additionally, ‘these powers are presumptively available,
rather than exceptional, in line with the goal of propor-
tionate, cost-effective and timely dispute resolution’.101
Hryniak challenges the primacy of the conventional trial
for resolving civil disputes by elevating the need
for the most proportionate, not ‘most painstaking proce-
dure’.102 Many legal observers wondered how the Cana-
dian legal community would respond to Hryniak and we
do not attempt to outline the subsequent case law in this
article. However, one litigator concluded on her pre-
liminary review of Ontario cases that ‘summary judg-
ment motion judges appear to have taken Hryniak to
heart’.103 Jonathan Lisus, a senior trial lawyer, writes
that Hryniak ‘seems to have touched a nerve in positive
and unexpected ways’.104 In his view, Hryniak invites
trial counsel to persuade judges to allow cost-conscious,
reasonably conducted trials such as ‘directed trials of
issues, hybrid trials with evidence in chief by affidavit,
stop-clock trials and bifurcated proceedings’.105 As the
lessons from Hryniak continue to percolate across the
country, there is hope that this decision will contribute
to the simplification and increased affordability of civil
justice.
It is worth noting that the summary judgement proce-
dure in Ontario is different than the procedure found in
British Columbia, potentially calling into question the
direct procedural applicability of Hryniak in British
Columbia (although, of course, the underlying princi-
98. Ontario Rules, above n. 59, r 20.04 (2)(a). Summary judgement can
also be granted if the parties agree to it, and the court is satisfied that
summary judgement is appropriate in the circumstances.
99. Hryniak, above n. 9, para. 49.
100. Ontario Rules, above n. 59, r 20.04 (2.1).
101. Hryniak, above n. 9, para. 67.
102. Ibid., paras. 1, 27-28.
103. S. Chaudhury, ‘Hryniak v. Mauldin: Has the Supreme Court Finally Pro-
vided Us with Clear Guidance on Summary Judgment?’, Paper Deliv-
ered at the Twelve-Minute Civil Litigator Conference, Law Society of
Upper Canada Continuing Professional Development, 18 September
2014, at 5 (unpublished).
104. J. Lisus, ‘Hryniak: Requiem for the Vanishing Trial, or Brave New
World’, 33(1) Advocates’ Society Journal 6 (2014), para. 12 (QL).
105. Ibid., para. 29.
ples will apply).106 In Ontario, motion judges have the
power to weigh evidence107 and the discretion to allow
oral evidence.108 In contrast, motion judges can only
decide whether there is a genuine issue for trial in Brit-
ish Columbia. As we discuss below, the limited scope of
the British Columbia summary judgement rule has led
to the primacy of the summary trial procedure in that
province.109
In addition, on issues of law alone, all jurisdictions in
Canada have a procedure for the expedient determina-
tion of a legal question.110 This procedure is known as a
‘special case’ or a ‘stated case’. For example, in New
Brunswick, a court may grant leave to hear a special case
on consent of the parties and with an agreed upon state-
ment of facts.111 A special case is typically only appro-
priate where the determination of the special case will
dispose of the underlying matter or advance the pro-
ceedings.112
2.3 Summary Trials
A procedural innovation that is somewhat similar to
summary judgement and simplified procedures is a
summary trial. While these concepts overlap, they are
each distinct. Simplified procedures govern the entirety
of the litigation process, whereas summary judgement
and summary trials are ways to resolve the dispute. An
Alberta Court of Appeal decision recently explained the
difference between these two dispute resolution mecha-
nisms:
Summary judgment disposes of a suit before trial and
summary trial after trial. Summary judgment
removes from the litigation stream those disputes in
which the [nonmoving party’s] position is without
merit. If the moving party’s position is unassailable, it
makes sense to allocate as few public and private
resources as possible to resolve a dispute the outcome
of which is obvious …. The summary trial mecha-
nism is designed to resolve disputes which display
features amenable to just resolution without accessing
all aspects of the trial protocol. Proceedings which do
106. Century Services Inc. v. LeRoy, 2014 BCSC 702, paras. 83-87, [2014]
BCJ No 725 rev’d on other grounds, 2015 BCCA 120, [2015] BCJ No
499 (QL). There is also some suggestion that Hryniak is not directly
applicable to the rules in Alberta. See text accompanying note 106,
below. The summary judgement rules in Saskatchewan are similar to
those in Ontario. SeeSaskatchewan Rules, above n. 61, r 7-5; Pervez v.
Caskey, 2013 SKQB 377, paras. 39, 431 Sask R 201.
107. Ontario Rules, above n. 59, r 20.04 (2.1).
108. Ibid., r 20.04 (2.2).
109. The British Columbia summary trial procedure is used in a majority of
cases in the province. See Honourable C.A. Osborne, Civil Justice
Reform Project: Summary of Findings & Recommendations (Toronto:
Queen’s Printer for Ontario) (2007), at 38-9, available at: <www.
attorneygeneral. jus. gov. on. ca/ english/ about/ pubs/ cjrp/ CJRP -Report_
EN. pdf>.
110. Walker and Sossin, above n. 68, at 221. See e.g. Ontario Rules, above
n. 59, r 22; British Columbia Rules, above n. 61, rr 9-3, 9-4; New-
foundland Rules, above n. 76, r 37; New Brunswick Rules, above n. 61,
r 24.01 (called a ‘stated case’).
111. Ibid., rr 24.01, 24.02, 24.04.
112. Ibid., r 24.01. See also Ontario Rules, above n. 59, r 22.01(2).
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not involve contested facts or complicated legal issues
are well suited for summary trial. But it is still a trial.113
The summary trial was first developed in 1983 in Brit-
ish Columbia as a response to the shortcomings of Brit-
ish Columbia’s summary judgement rule. Summary
judgement motions had caused dissatisfaction in the
province. Under the British Columbia rules, summary
judgement could only be granted in cases where there
was no reasonable defence to a claim. Thus, ‘artful
pleaders’ could raise an argument that would defeat a
summary judgement motion.114 The summary trial pro-
cedure was the legislature’s response to these challenges.
Under the British Columbia rules, summary trials are
conducted through affidavit evidence, and the evidence
can include an expert report or part of an examination
for discovery.115 The judge has broad discretion to order
cross-examinations on affidavits.116 Judgement may be
granted in favour of either party unless ‘the court is
unable … to find the facts necessary to decide the issues
of fact or law’ or ‘the court is of the opinion that it
would be unjust to decide the issues on the
application’.117 A summary trial in British Columbia,
unlike summary judgement in that province, can be
used to merely decide ‘an issue’ in dispute.118
Other provinces have followed British Columbia’s lead
and implemented summary trial procedures.119 For
example, Alberta adopted a summary trial procedure
similar to that of British Columbia.120 However, unlike
in British Columbia, oral evidence is permitted during a
summary trial in Alberta with the permission of the
judge.121 Alberta’s summary judgement procedure is
similar to British Columbia’s procedure, but it also
shares features with the more comprehensive Ontario
procedure. As the Alberta courts develop the summary
judgement procedure in light of Hyrniak, it remains to
be seen whether summary judgement will overtake the
role of summary trials in Alberta.122
In Ontario, summary trials are available in a more limi-
ted context. In a case under the simplified rules, parties
may opt to have a summary trial rather than an ordinary
113. Can v. Calgary Police Service, 2014 ABCA 322, paras. 87-88, 315 CCC
(3d) 337 (citations omitted).
114. Inspiration Management Ltd v. McDermid St Lawrence Ltd (1989), 36
BCLR (2d) 202, [1989] BCJ No 1003 (QL), paras. 37-38 (CA) [cited to
QL]. However, the British Columbia summary judgement rules are dif-
ferent that the rules in Ontario. See above text accompanying n.
106-109.
115. British Columbia Rules, above n. 61, r 9-7(5).
116. Ibid., r 9-7(12).
117. Ibid., r 9-7(15).
118. Century Services Inc. v. LeRoy, 2015 BCCA 120, paras. 38-49, [2015]
BCJ No 499 (QL).
119. See e.g. Manitoba Rules, above n. 61, r 20.06; Ontario Rules, above n.
59, r 76.12 (1); Alberta Rules, above n. 91, rr 7.5-7.11. See also Nova
Scotia Rules, above n. 76, r 57.11 (which requires an ‘economic trial’
for actions claiming under $100,000).
120. Alberta Rules, above n. 91, rr 7.5-7.11.
121. Ibid., rr 6.11(1)(g), 7.7(2).
122. See Windsor v. Canadian Pacific Railway, 2014 ABCA 108, 371 DLR
(4th) 339. But see Can v. Calgary Police Service, 2014 ABCA 322,
paras. 97-104, 116 WCB (2d) 578.
trial.123 Under the summary trial procedure in Ontario,
evidence is adduced by affidavit, but the plaintiff and
defendant have the opportunity to examine and cross-
examine the deponents for a short period of time.124
Furthermore, oral argument is permitted after the pre-
sentation of the evidence.125
Summary trials have been very popular in British
Columbia given the limits of the province’s summary
judgement procedure.126 Even in provinces such as
Ontario, where the summary judgement procedure is
flexible and robust, summary trials are a useful tool to
simplify and expedite the dispute resolution process.
2.4 Small Claims Courts
Small claims courts have a long history in Canada. Orig-
inating from the early debt collection courts, these
courts have been re-imagined through legislative
reforms and are now commonplace across the
country.127 They have been very popular with litigants;
for example, 66,059 claims were filed in Ontario Small
Claims Court in 2012-2013, representing 45% of all civ-
il cases commenced in the province that year.128 One
commentator lists the following as the goals and hall-
marks of small claims courts: informality, ease, speed,
affordability, fairness, and resolves small disputes.129
While a ‘uniform mandate [for small claims courts]
across the country remains illusory’,130 common features
exist in the courts in each province.131
Eligibility to pursue an action in small claims court is
governed by the monetary value of the claim. As these
courts are premised on efficiency and simplicity, mone-
tary limits impact the types of litigants that can access
these informal courts. In most provinces, small claims
courts have jurisdiction over cases valued at $25,000 and
123. Ontario Rules, above n. 59, r 76.10(6).
124. Ibid., r 76.12 (1).
125. Ibid.
126. Osborne, above n. 109, at 38-9.
127. S. McGill, ‘Small Claims Court Identity Crisis: A Review of Recent
Reform Measures’, 49 Canadian Business Law Journal 213, at 214
(2010); I. Ramsay, ‘Small Claims Courts: A Review’ in Rethinking Civil
Justice: Research Studies for the Civil Justice Review (Toronto: Ontario
Law Reform Commission) (1996) 489, at 492.
128. Ministry of the Attorney General, Court Services Division: Annual
Report 2012-2013 (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario) (2013), at
36, available at: <www. attorneygeneral. jus. gov. on. ca/ english/ about/
pubs/ courts_ annual_ 12/ Court_ Services_ Annual_ Report_ FULL_ EN. pdf>.
For information in the British Columbia courts, see Provincial Court of
British Columbia, Annual Report 2013-2014 (2014), at 14, available at:
<www. provincialcourt. bc. ca/ downloads/ pdf/ AnnualReport2013 -2014.
pdf>.
129. McGill, above n. 127, at 217-8.
130. Ibid., at 249.
131. Many studies have discussed small claims in Canada at length. See e.g.
Ramsay, above n. 127; McGill, above n. 127; S.C. McGuire and R.A.
MacDonald, ‘Small Claims Court Cant’, 34(3) Osgoode Hall Law Jour-
nal 509 (1996); M.W. Patry, V. Stinson & S.M. Smith, Evaluation of the
Nova Scotia Small Claims Court: Final Report to the Nova Scotia Law
Reform Commission (Halifax: Saint Mary’s University) (2009), available
at: <www. lawreform. ns. ca/ Downloads/ SmallClaimsFinaReportFINAL.
pdf>.
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under.132 Québec has a lower limit, as its small claims
court will currently only hear matter valued at $15,000
or less.133 In contrast, Alberta recently raised the upper
limit of the monetary jurisdiction of its small claims
courts from $25,000 to $50,000.134 This reform must be
viewed in the context of Alberta’s ‘simple’ and ‘com-
plex’ categorisation of claims, as discussed above. The
mixed methodologies of classifying claims in Alberta
may give litigants increased choice for court-based dis-
pute resolution.
Provinces also have different approaches to who can
access small claims courts and the types of claims that
these courts can hear. Some small claims courts were
designed as a ‘people’s court’, and therefore, these
courts restrict the access of certain corporate actors.135
For example, in Québec and Nova Scotia, business
creditors only have limited access to small claims
courts.136 In other provinces, these concerns are not
manifest. In Ontario, a large portion of the small claims
docket is debt collection.137 In fact, British Columbia
started a pilot project for a specific debt collection pro-
cedure in small claims courts.138
The cost of small claims is also an important indicator of
whether these courts are making the justice system more
affordable. One indicia of cost is the necessity of repre-
sentation in small matters.139 In Québec, lawyers are
forbidden from representing litigants in small claims
courts, absent exceptional circumstances.140 Yet, law-
yers are permitted in many provinces.141 Some have
argued that lawyers should not be permitted in small
132. This is the highest value Small Claims Courts will hear in Ontario, British
Columbia, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and Labrador, and the Yukon.
See Small Claims Court Jurisdiction and Appeal Limit, O Reg 626/00, s
1 (Ontario); Small Claims Rules, BC Reg 261/93, r 1(4) [BC Small
Claims Rules]; Small Claims Court Forms and Procedures Regulations,
NS Reg 17/93, s 2(b) (Nova Scotia); Small Claims Rules, NL Reg 52/97,
r 3(4) [Newfoundland Small Claims Rules]; Small Claims Court Regula-
tions, YOIC 1995/152, Sched A, cl 1 (Yukon). See also S. Mireau,
‘Small Claims’, SLAW, 15 July 2014, available at: <www. slaw. ca/ 2014/
07/ 15/ small -claims/>.
133. Code of Civil Procedure, Art. 953.
134. ‘Higher Small Claims Court Limit Increases Access to Justice’, 21 July
2014, available at: <http:// alberta. ca/ release. cfm ?xID= 36856F648A53F
-BA5B -A6D3 -942144FBE5372212>. See Provincial Court Civil Division
Regulation, AR 329/89, s 1.1. The small claims court in Alberta is
known as the Civil Division of the Provincial Court of Alberta.
135. See McGuire and MacDonald, above n. 131, at 531.
136. Code of Civil Procedure, Art. 953 (Québec); Small Claims Court Act,
RSNS 1989, c 430, s 5 [Nova Scotia Small Claims Act]. McGuire and
MacDonald note that, despite these restrictions, the Montréal Small
Claims court they studied was ‘heavily populated’ by debt collection
claims pursued by ‘professionals and self-employed businesspersons’.
See McGuire and MacDonald, above n. 131, at 531.
137. L.M. Olivo and D.M.P. Gonsalves, Small Claims Court Practice and
Procedure in Ontario (Concord, ON: Captus Press) (2013), at 136. See
also Patry, Stinson & Smith, above n. 131, at 9-10.
138. BC Small Claims Rules, above n. 132, r 9.2. See also Ministry of Justice,
‘Provincial Small Claims Court Pilot’, 16 January 2014, available at:
<www. ag. gov. bc. ca/ courts/ small_ claims/ info/ pilot. htm>.
139. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss small claims court fees,
but these are also important costs that impact the cost of small claims.
For a discussion of this issue, see McGill, above n. 127, at 231-4.
140. Code of Civil Procedure, Art. 959.
141. See e.g. Nova Scotia Small Claims Act, above n. 136, s 16; BC Small
Claims Rules, above n. 132, r 17(20); Small Claims Act, 1997, SS 1997,
c S-50.11, s 29 [Saskatchewan Small Claims Act].
claims courts, as they increase costs and power imbalan-
ces between litigants.142 Provinces such as Saskatchewan
and Manitoba allow lawyers but discourage their use by
limiting the costs awards available for legal fees.143 In
Ontario, lawyers and other legal actors such as para-
legals and law students are permitted to represent indi-
viduals in small claims court.144 Perhaps, Ontario’s
approach of allowing a broader range of representatives
provides more flexibility and affordability to those who
do seek representation.
Post-recession austerity did impact small claims in one
jurisdiction in Canada. In 2009, the New Brunswick
government announced that it would abolish its small
claims court and transfer all claims to the trial court.145
The government justified its decision as a cost-saving
measure given the financial difficulties facing the prov-
ince.146 The Canadian Bar Association opposed this
move147 and the Chief Justice of the New Bruns-
wick Court of Queen’s Bench called the decision ‘regres-
sive’.148 During the next provincial election, the opposi-
tion campaigned on a promise to reinstate the small
claims court. After winning the election, the new gov-
ernment followed through and reintroduced the
court.149 As this chapter in Canadian provincial politics
demonstrates, small claims courts are an important
aspect of Canadian civil justice, irrespective of funding
difficulties.
An exciting technological innovation in British Colum-
bia may spark a new way to resolve small claims in the
future. In 2012, the British Columbia government
passed the Civil Resolution Tribunal Act, introducing
142. Patry, Stinson & Smith, above n. 131, at 17-9.
143. McGill, above n. 127, at 230-31. See e.g. Newfoundland Small Claims
Rules, above n. 132, r 24(2) (in Newfoundland, costs are capped at
10% of the claim); Saskatchewan Small Claims Act, above n. 141, s 31
(no lawyer-related costs can be granted); The Court of Queen’s Bench
Small Claims Practices Act, RSM 1987, c C285 (CCSM c C285), s 14(1)
(in Manitoba, costs are capped at $100).
144. Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C.43, s 26 (‘A party may be repre-
sented in a proceeding in the Small Claims Court by a person authorized
under the Law Society Act to represent the party’). A Law Society by-
law provides that paralegals, law students, and various other non-law-
yers can represent individuals in Ontario Small Claims Court. See Law
Society of Upper Canada, by-law 4, Licensing, ss 5-6, 13, 28-35; Olivo
and Gonsalves, above n. 137, at 13-24. Additionally, a pro bono pro-
gramme in Ontario provides summary advice and assistance to small
claims litigants that are eligible. See ‘Pro Bono (Free) Legal Assistance’,
available at: <https:// www. lawhelpontario. org/ lawsuits -disputes/ small
claimscourt/ howwehelp/>.
145. See An Act to Repeal the Small Claims Act, SNB 2009, c 28.
146. McGill, above n. 127, at 242.
147. Canadian Bar Association, News Release, ‘CBA-NB Opposes Elimination
of Small Claims Court’, 16 March 2009, available at: <www. cba. org/
NB/ pdf/ New%20Release%20March%202009. pdf>.
148. ‘Access to Justice Compromised in New Brunswick by Elimination of
Small Claims Court’, 10 March 2010, available at: <www. ccla. org/
rightswatch/ 2010/ 03/ 10/ access -to -justice -compromised -in -new -
brunswick -by -elimination -of -small -claims -court/>.
149. See Small Claims Act, SNB 2012, c 15. See also CBC News, ‘Small
Claims Court to be Reinstated’, CBC News, 5 April 2012, available at:
<www. cbc. ca/ news/ canada/ new -brunswick/ small -claims -court -to -be -
reinstated -1. 1186899>; CBC News, ‘Small Claims Court Bill Intro-
duced’, CBC News, 11 May 2012, available at: <www. cbc. ca/ news/
canada/ new -brunswick/ small -claims -court -bill -introduced -1. 1186897>.
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Canada’s first online dispute resolution forum.150
Although the tribunal is not yet operational, it is expec-
ted to launch online this year.151 The Chair of the Civil
Resolution Tribunal explained that this innovation will
provide 24 hours ‘access to interactive information path-
ways, tools, and a variety of dispute resolution methods
including negotiation, facilitation and, if necessary,
adjudication’.152 Parties must represent themselves in
most circumstances.153 If a matter proceeds through the
tribunal to adjudication, a tribunal member will receive
submissions and render a binding judgement, delivered
via e-mail.154 The provincial government introduced a
new bill in March 2015 that will require small claims to
proceed through the Civil Resolution Tribunal before
moving to small claims court.155 If this project is suc-
cessful, it could reshape civil justice for small matters in
British Columbia and act as a model for other jurisdic-
tions.156
2.5 Court-Based Alternative Dispute Resolution
While our focus to this point has been on court-based
dispute resolution in small and simple matters, our dis-
cussion would be incomplete without canvassing the
pre-trial alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes
in place across Canada. Like many jurisdictions around
the world, Canada has embraced ADR as an effective set
of tools for resolving civil and family disputes. Although
growing in modern popularity since the 1970s, in 1996,
the Canadian Bar Association released an influential
report recommending that all jurisdictions ‘make availa-
ble as part of the civil justice system opportunities for
litigants to use non-binding dispute-resolution process-
es as early as possible in the litigation process’.157 Most
jurisdictions in Canada have headed this recommenda-
tion. In this section, we outline some of the specific
state-based or state-sanctioned pre-trial ADR pro-
150. Civil Resolution Tribunal Act, SBC 2012, c 25. See also Ministry of Jus-
tice, ‘Civil Resolution Tribunal Act’, 10 March 2015, available at: <www.
ag. gov. bc. ca/ legislation/ civil -resolution -tribunal -act/>.
151. ‘FAQs’, available at: <www. civilresolutionbc. ca/ faqs/>.
152. S. Slater, ‘B.C.’s Civil Resolution Tribunal’, Paper Delivered at the
Osgoode Forum on Administrative Law and Practice, Toronto, Ontario,
23-24 October 2014, available at: <www. civilresolutionbc. ca/ b -c -s -civil
-resolution -tribunal/>.
153. J. Sorensen, ‘B.C. Lawyers Worried about Exclusion from New Civil Res-
olution Tribunal’, Canadian Lawyer Magazine, 2 September 2013,
available at: <www. canadianlawyermag. com/ legalfeeds/ 1653/ bc -
lawyers -worried -about -exclusion -from -new -civil -resolution -tribunal.
html>.
154. Slater, above n. 152.
155. Bill 19, Civil Resolution Tribunal Amendment Act, 2015, 4th Sess, 40th
Parliament, British Columbia, cl 14.1.
156. For other Canadian online dispute resolution initiatives in the context of
traffic offences, see M. Erdle, ‘Ontario Joins Wider Move toward Online
Dispute Resolution to Ease Court Burdens’, SLAW, 25 March 2015,
available at: <www. slaw. ca/ 2015/ 03/ 25/ ontario -joins -wider -move -
toward -online -dispute -resolution -to -ease -court -burdens/>.
157. Canadian Bar Association, Systems of Civil Justice: Task Force Report
(Ottawa, Canadian Bar Association) (1996), at v, available at: <https://
www. cba. org/ cba/ pubs/ pdf/ systemscivil_ tfreport. pdf>. For current
national calls for continued efforts in this and related areas, see e.g.
Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and Family Matters,
above n. 8, at 13, 22.
grammes that have been implemented across the coun-
try.158
Mediation is a popular early dispute resolution mecha-
nism that is recommended or required in several provin-
ces and in certain small claims courts.159 Saskatchewan
was one of the first provinces to implement mandatory
mediation in civil proceedings.160 This reform was
implemented to achieve better substantive results for lit-
igants, not to address court backlog in the province.161
Mediators in the Saskatchewan programme are general-
ly non-lawyers and are assigned by the government to
any civil claim filed in court.162 A study of Saskatche-
wan’s mediation programme conducted 10 years after its
implementation concluded that, despite several chal-
lenges, ‘some of [the program’s] ambitious goals for cul-
tural and systemic change are being realized. The pro-
cess of litigation has been altered in some significant
ways, for both lawyers and clients’.163 Mandatory medi-
ation is also required in actions commenced in three of
the major litigation centres in Ontario.164 The stated
goal of the Ontario programme is to ‘reduce cost and
delay in litigation and facilitate the early and fair resolu-
tion of disputes’.165 Unlike in Saskatchewan, parties
must privately contract with an approved mediator in
Ontario.166 Despite this difference, the Ontario pro-
gramme has also been well received.167
Beyond mediation, many provinces require or recom-
mend that parties engage in settlement discussions or a
158. In this article, we focus primarily on formal state-based, as opposed to
all public and private, forms of ADR processes. For a recent and much
more detailed discussion of state-based, state-sanctioned, and fully pri-
vate ADR programs, initiatives, and trends in place across the country,
see Farrow, Civil Justice, above n. 5, at 89-117.
159. See e.g. Alberta Rules, above n. 91, r 4.16; Alberta Court of Queen’s
Bench, ‘Alberta Justice Mediation Service for the Court of Queen’s
Bench’, available at: <https:// albertacourts. ca/ court -of -queens -bench/
civil -mediation>; Ontario Rules, above n. 59, r 24.1.04(1); The Queen’s
Bench Act, 1998, SS 1998, c Q-1.01, s 42 [Saskatchewan Queen’s
Bench Act]; Saskatchewan Rules, above n. 61, r 4-10; Newfoundland
Rules, above n. 76, r 37A. In British Columbia, mediation is not manda-
tory, but any party to a claim can serve the other parties to the action
with a Notice to Mediate. In doing so, any party can compel the others
to participate in mediation. See Notice to Mediate (General) Regula-
tion, BC Reg 4/2001. Some small claims courts also incorporate media-
tion. See McGill, above n. 127 at 237-9; Farrow, Civil Justice, above n.
5, at 113-6.
160. Saskatchewan Queen’s Bench Act, above n. 159, s 42; Saskatchewan
Rules, above n. 61, r 4-10.
161. J. MacFarlane and M. Keet, ‘Civil Justice Reform and Mandatory Civil
Mediation in Saskatchewan: Lessons from a Maturing Program’ 42(3)
Alberta Law Review 677, at 678-9 (2005).
162. Ibid., at 682, 693.
163. Ibid., at 681.
164. Ontario Rules, above n. 59, r 24.1.04(1).
165. Ibid., r 24.1.01.
166. MacFarlane and Keet, above n. 161, at 682. Alberta also provides a ros-
ter of approved mediators to choose from. See Alberta Court of
Queen’s Bench, above n. 159. See also Mediation Rules of the Provin-
cial Court – Civil Division, Alta Reg 271/97.
167. Farrow, above n. 5, at 106-7.
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settlement conference before proceedings to trial.168 In
British Columbia and Québec, the parties may request a
settlement conference where a judge or master ‘must, in
private and without hearing witnesses, explore all pos-
sibilities of settlement of the issues that are outstand-
ing’.169 Ontario requires that parties schedule a pre-trial
conference after setting down an action for trial to, inter
alia, ‘provide an opportunity for any or all of the issues
in a proceeding to be settled without a hearing’.170 In
certain provinces, there are also cost consequences if a
party fails to accept a favourable settlement offer.171 The
most recent proposal in this area is from Québec. In its
newly proposed civil justice rules, parties ‘must consider
private prevention and resolution processes before refer-
ring their dispute to the courts’.172
A specific type of settlement conference is commonplace
in two of the Prairie Provinces. Judicial dispute resolu-
tion (JDR) is widespread across Alberta, although the
province’s rules only require good faith participation in
one of several ADR process prior to trial.173 JDR is a
confidential pre-trial settlement conference that is led
by a judge, as opposed to a master, mediator, or adjudi-
cator.174 If no agreement is reached during the confer-
ence, the judge may give a non-binding opinion as to
how he or she would decide the case on the facts.175 The
Alberta judiciary is largely responsible for JDR, and the
evidence of high usage rates and high settlement rates
suggests that it has been successful.176 Judicially assisted
dispute resolution (JADR), a programme similar to
168. See e.g. British Columbia Rules, above n. 61, Part 9; Ontario Rules,
above n. 59, r 50; Code of Civil Procedure, Arts. 151.14-151.23 (Qué-
bec); Nova Scotia Rules, above n. 76, rr 10.11-10.16; New Brunswick
Rules, above n. 61, rr 50.07-50.15; Newfoundland Rules, above n. 76,
18.A.06(3). A settlement conference is even required in every contested
small claims matter in Ontario. See Ontario Small Claims Rules, O Reg
258/98, r 13.01.
169. British Columbia Rules, above n. 61, r 9-2(1); Code of Civil Procedure,
Art. 151.16 (in Québec’s Code of Civil Procedure, very similar language
is used).
170. Ontario Rules, above n. 59, rr 50.01, 50.02.
171. See e.g. Ontario Rules, above n. 59, r 49.10; British Columbia Rules,
above n. 61, r 9-1(4).
172. Bill 28, An Act to Establish the New Code of Civil Procedure, 1st Sess,
40th Leg, Québec, 2015, cl 1 (assented to 21 February 2014). The bill
will come into force 1 January 2016. See Y. Saint-Cyr, ‘Reminder: New
Quebec Code of Civil Procedures Effective January 1, 2016’, SLAW, 29
October 2015, available at: <www. slaw. ca/ 2015/ 10/ 29/ reminder -new -
quebec -code -of -civil -procedures -effective -january -1 -2016/>; Justice
Québec, ‘Code of Civil Procedure’, 24 February 2014, available at:
<www. justice. gouv. qc. ca/ english/ sujets/ glossaire/ code -proc -a. htm>.
173. Alberta Rules, above n. 91, r 4.16.
174. See Ibid., rr 4.18-4.21; See ‘Judicial Dispute Resolution (Alberta)’
(2015), available at: <www. justice. gc. ca/ eng/ fl -df/ fjs -sjf/ view -affic.
asp ?uid= 88>.
175. Ibid.
176. Farrow, above n. 5, at 98-9. But see Hon H.F. Landerkin and A.J. Pirie,
‘Judges as Mediators: What’s the Problem with Judicial Dispute Resolu-
tion in Canada’, 82 Canadian Bar Review 249 (2003). See also Ontario
Bar Association Judicial Mediation Taskforce, A Different ‘Day in Court’:
The Role of the Judiciary in Facilitating Settlements (Toronto: OBA)
(2013), available at: <www. oba. org/ getattachment/ News -Media/
News/ 2013/ July -2013/ A -Different -‘Day -in -Court -The -Role -of -the -
Judiciar/ ADifferentDayInCourt7122013. pdf>; N. Aylwin and T.C.W.
Farrow, ‘“A Different Day in Court”: Exploring the Place of Judicial
Mediation in Ontario’s Alternative Dispute Resolution Landscape’, 3
Journal of Civil Litigation and Practice 122 (2014).
JDR, is also available to litigants in Manitoba.177 Partici-
pation in this programme is voluntary,178 but it too has
been a success. According to one lawyer, ‘[c]ivil litiga-
tion matters are [now] three-to-four times more likely to
proceed to JADR than to trial’.179
Taken together, these court-sanctioned and court-based
ADR programmes have fundamentally altered the pro-
cess of litigation in Canada. Their emphasis on early
dispute resolution has kept many cases from proceeding
to trial and has placed professional obligations on law-
yers to settle cases as soon as practicable.180 Although
these ADR programmes have been widespread and suc-
cessful, expediting resolution of matters and lowering
costs for litigants, they have also led to a partial privati-
sation of the civil justice. In Hryniak, the Supreme
Court wrote that ‘without an accessible public forum for
the adjudication of disputes, the rule of law is threat-
ened and the development of the common law under-
mined’.181 It is essential that these pre-trial ADR proce-
dures do not usurp the role of public courts, preventing
important cases from public adjudication.182
3 Conclusion
In this article, we have outlined some of the Canadian
challenges to access to justice and the procedures in
place to simplify and reduce the costs of civil justice. In
our review of existing empirical data, recent govern-
mental austerity measures have not directly driven
reform in Canada (although an overall lack of public
funding is clearly a major impediment to meaningful
civil justice reform capacity). More empirical data are
needed to strengthen our observations. As Canadian civ-
il justice reformers continue to organise and collaborate
on a national level, an important ongoing project must
be to collect more data. Without further data, progress
in meaningful civil and access to justice innovation and
reform will be slow and will lack the sophisticated evi-
dence-based understandings that are required for lasting
and meaningful change.
Rising legal costs and delays in civil justice have created
a gap between the need for legal services and the afford-
ability of those services. This ‘gap’ has been driving
more of the court and legislative initiatives in Canada.
This is a ‘gap’ that also pre-dated the recent world eco-
177. ‘Manitoba Judicially Assisted Dispute Resolution (JADR)’, 8 August
2012, available at: <www. cfcj -fcjc. org/ inventory -of -reforms/ manitoba -
judicially -assisted -dispute -resolution -jadr>.
178. All that is required is a pre-trial conference. See Manitoba Rules, above
n. 61, r 50.01.
179. G.A. Derwin, ‘Judicially Assisted Dispute Resolution: Ten Years of Suc-
cess’, CBA ADR Newsletter, April 2008, available at: <www. cba. org/
cba/ newsletters/ adr -2008/ news. aspx#article3>.
180. See e.g. Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Model Code of Profes-
sional Conduct, 10 October 2014, s 3.2-4 (‘A lawyer must advise and
encourage a client to compromise or settle a dispute whenever it is pos-
sible to do so on a reasonable basis…’).
181. Hryniak, above n. 9, para. 26.
182. For further discussion of this concern, see Farrow, Civil Justice, above
n. 5.
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nomic challenges (although, of course, those challenges
have not helped funding in this area). However, it is
clear that access to justice challenges are continuing to
grow, and there is a widely held view that immediate
action on this front is needed.
Despite the absence of jurisdictional uniformity in Can-
ada, many jurisdictions have recently implemented pro-
grammes in response to this widely held and growing
concern with a view to addressing the access to justice
crisis. Robust simplified procedures and access to early
ADR have been successful and generally popular across
the county. Some of these procedures are still in their
infancy or early adolescence, and only time will tell if
they can inspire major change in the delivery of civil
justice. More time will also be needed to study the
impacts of these programmes more closely – both in
terms of their immediate efficiency-based and other
merits (often, although not always, involving cost and
time savings as well as party autonomy and control), and
in terms of their potential negative implications (poten-
tial lack of transparency and a negative impact on the
development of public accountability and precedent).183
The Action Committee, led by Justice Thomas Crom-
well of the Supreme Court of Canada, released an ambi-
tious report outlining a collaborative and national vision
for civil and family justice reform.184 This report
includes a clear acknowledgement of Canada’s growing
access to justice crisis, the basis for a significant culture
shift in the justice sector, and a specific set of concrete
recommendations for the future of reform. Of course,
the long-term impact of the Action Committee will
largely depend on whether actors across the provinces
and territories can come together to implement the
report’s recommendations (early indicators are very pos-
itive). With divergent civil jurisdictions and systems,
national projects are always difficult to execute in Cana-
da. Much depends on local efforts and projects. Legal
service providers – lawyers, paralegals, and potentially
other groups and forms of professionals and services –
will also need to pay more attention on these important
access to justice challenges and opportunities.185 Yet,
the current initiatives across the country, as well as new
ideas such as British Columbia’s online Civil Resolution
Tribunal and the development of new centres for justice
innovation,186 provide hope that Canada will be able to
simplify, expedite, and increase access to civil justice in
183. For recent and extensive commentary, debate and analysis on these
issues, see Farrow, Civil Justice, above n. 5.
184. See Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and Family Matters,
above n. 8. For a discussion of the Action Committee’s work and its
potential future impact, see T.C.W. Farrow, ‘A New Wave of Access to
Justice Reform in Canada’, in A. Dodek and A. Woolley (eds.), In Search
of the Ethical Lawyer (Vancouver: UBC Press) (2016), c. 8.
185. See e.g. the Law Society of Upper Canada’s 2015-2019 strategic plan,
Focused on the Future, which includes ‘enhance access to justice…’ as
one of its five core strategic mandates, available at: <www. lsuc. on. ca/
strategic -plan/>. See further Action Committee on Access to Justice in
Civil and Family Matters, above n. 8, at 14-5.
186. See e.g. the recently created Winkler Institute for Dispute Resolution at
Osgoode Hall Law School in Toronto, available at: <http://
winklerinstitute. ca/>.
meaningful ways over the coming years. All signs are
pointing in the right direction.
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